This paper investigates the interplay of abnormal loan growth, credit reporting system and systemic risk in banking. Based on a sample of publicly traded banks in Asia from 1998 to 2012, higher abnormal loan growth leads to higher systemic risk one year ahead. A closer investigation further suggests that better credit information coverage and private credit bureaus can stem the buildup of bank systemic risk one year ahead due to higher abnormal loan growth. Eventually, this paper offers some supports to strengthen macro-prudential regulation to limit abnormal loan growth. This paper also advocates the importance of strengthening credit information coverage and the role of private credit bureaus in Asian countries to mitigate the negative impact of abnormal loan growth on bank systemic stability.
Introduction
The 2008 credit crisis due to the rapid growth of the subprime mortgage lending has raised concerns for policy makers, as higher financial intermediation might exacerbate financial instability. A large number of studies have documented that excessive loan growth is indeed detrimental for bank stability, which may end up in financial crisis (e.g. Demyanyk and Van Hermet, 2011; Dell' Ariccia et al., 2008; Gorton, 2009; Foos et al., 2010; Festić et al., 2011) . Such evidence also sheds light on the fact that bank lending and thus credit risk are procyclical through the business cycle. Phrased differently, banks tend to underestimate credit risk by loosening credit standards during economic booms, but overestimate credit risk during economic downturns (Berger and Udell, 2004) . Accordingly, ensuring prudent lending decisions has become a major policy focus related to bank capital regulation. In the Basel III accord particularly, such bank capital regulation has been refined not only to absorb bank risk exposures, but also to stem the buildup of systemic risk driven by business cycle fluctuations (Arnold et al., 2013) . For instance, banks are required to generate counter-cyclical capital buffer during economic booms in order to dampen excessive loan growth. Therefore, it is expected that banks already have sufficient "reserves" to boost lending activities and help economic recovery during economic downturns.
Despite the importance of regulating imprudent bank lending decisions to mitigate the buildup of bank systemic risk, prior literature has not explicitly revealed how loan growth affects systemic risk in banking. Only the link between loan growth and bank-specific riskiness is empirically analyzed, notably in the context of developed countries (e.g. Sinkey and Greenwalt, 1991; Salas and Saurina, 2002; Hess et al., 2009; Foos et al., 2010 ). Yet, although several studies have examined how bank loan growth affects macroeconomic development and stability in developing countries and transition economies (e.g. Cotarelli et al., 2005; Kraft and Jankov, 2005; Festić et al., 2011) , the issue of bank systemic risk also remains unexplored. This paper aims to extend previous work on the link between abnormal loan growth and bank riskiness in two directions. First, we examine the impact of abnormal loan growth on bank systemic risk instead of bank-level riskiness as in the aforementioned studies.
Second, we augment the analysis by assessing whether the impact of abnormal loan growth on bank systemic risk is conditional on the degree of credit information sharing, because greater asymmetric information on the credit market may result in financial instability (e.g. Mishkin, 1991; Sau, 2003) . From the latter contribution, this paper is the first to build an empirical link between the "growth-risk nexus in bank lending" literature and the "information sharing-stability" literature.
In this paper, Asian countries are taken into close consideration, as the banking sector plays a prominent role in providing financial sources for private sector businesses. In the meantime, only few papers have studied the issue of loan growth in Asian banking (e.g. Craig et al., 2006; Angklomkliew et al., 2009; Packer and Zhu, 2012) . Considering Asian countries to study the issues of loan growth, credit information sharing and systemic risk is also quite relevant in several respects. For instance, Hong Kong and South Korea have experienced rapid credit growth that outstripped bank ability to cope with credit risk (Asia Focus, 2011) .
During the 2000s decade, credit card defaults and personal bankruptcies were prevalent in these two countries. Moreover, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Hong Kong and South Korea were also the countries affected by the 1997 Asian crisis due to excessive bank lending, particularly in property and real estate sectors (Sachs and Woo, 2000; . Such evidence suggests the need for Asian banks to strengthen credit risk management. Eventually, the quality of credit reporting system in strengthening bank credit risk management through better information sharing on the creditworthiness of borrowers, should be of concern for policy makers at least in the Asian context. From a dynamic panel data methodology, we find that higher abnormal loan growth is associated with an increase in bank systemic risk one year ahead. A closer investigation further reveals that better credit information coverage and private credit bureaus -but not public credit registries -can mitigate the buildup of bank systemic risk driven by higher abnormal loan growth. These findings emphasize the importance of the quality of credit information coverage and private credit bureaus, in order to mitigate the adverse impact of abnormal loan growth on systemic stability.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents related literature on the issues of bank loan growth, risk and credit information sharing. Section 3 describes data sources, variables and methodology used in this paper. Section 4 discusses empirical findings and provides several robustness checks. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
Related literature review
During economic booms, it is perceived that banks tend to underestimate credit risk and boost lending activities (Borio et al., 2001; Berger and Udell, 2004) . Such bank behavior is referred to as the procyclicality of bank lending and risk management, as banks are likely to overestimate credit risk and reduce lending during economic downturns, which may in turn precipitate recessions (e.g. Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008 & 2012) .
Because bank lending and credit risk management tend to be procyclical over the business cycle, it may imply that excessive bank loan growth during economic booms may exacerbate the buildup of bank riskiness. Salas and Saurina (2002) use a large set of Spanish commercial banks during the 1985-1997 period, and find that the loan growth of banks has impacted bank stability. Their results highlight that higher loan growth is associated with higher loan losses three (or four) years ahead. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) also point out that banks tend to delay provisioning for non-performing loans until it is too late -when recession already set in. Notwithstanding the importance of overcoming excessive bank loan growth, another strand of literature highlights that bank risk-taking behavior can also be explained by the quality of credit information sharing. The "information sharing-stability" literature suggests that better credit information sharing allows banks to mitigate borrower moral hazard, and to prevent adverse selection due information asymmetry on the credit market (Padilla and Pagano, 2000; Beck et al., 2013) . In parallel, several studies also emphasize that better credit reporting systems contribute to boost bank lending activities and economic growth, as well as bank international expansion (e.g. Pagano and Jappelli, 1993; Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Houston et al.; 2010; Tsai et al., 2011; Love and Mylenko, 2003; Brown et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2013) . Given that credit information sharing affects bank stability and financial intermediation, the interplay of bank loan growth and systemic risk may be conditional on the quality of credit information sharing. Concomitantly, a large number of studies also use another measure of bank systemic risk based the conditional value-at-risk (∆CoVaR) approach (e.g. Acharya et al., 2010; Brownless and Engle, 2011; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) . However, measuring bank systemic risk using the correlation approach has advantages over other measures including ∆CoVaR. This is because the correlation of bank-specific risk can avoid volatility bias that may underestimate bank systemic risk, particularly in good times (Anginer et al., 2014; Pukhtuanthong and Roll, 2009; Bekaert and Wang, 2009) . Billio et al. (2012) assert that during economic booms, financial innovation emerges and the risk codependence of banks also increases. Meanwhile, substantial bank losses may have not yet materialized in this phase. Using the ∆CoVaR approach to account for bank losses in good times results in low levels of ∆CoVaR and hence, the high risk codependence among financial institutions that reflects the systemic risk of banks cannot be accurately determined (Anginer et al., 2014) .
In this present paper, we use the time-varying correlation of bank-specific risk to account for bank systemic risk. Based on a single-index market model, the time-varying correlation of bank-specific risk is computed using the exponentially-weighted moving other Asian countries . Moreover, we also exclude Australia,
given that the Australian banking industry is considered as one of the safest banking industry which is neither affected by the 1997 Asian crisis, nor the 2008 global financial crisis (Haq et al., 2013) . Finally, Taiwanese banks are also excluded from the sample, because the Doing Business database does not cover data related to credit reporting system in Taiwan.
To assess information sharing activities, we consider several proxies of the quality of the credit reporting system at the country level. This dataset is collected from the Doing We further incorporate macroeconomic indicators to control for country-specific factors that can influence the degree of bank systemic risk. These include the logarithm of real gross domestic product per capita (LGDPC) and Economic Freedom index (ECOFREE) to control for the degree of economic development and institutional quality, respectively.
LGDPC and ECOFREE are retrieved from the Global Financial Development database and
Heritage Foundation, respectively.
Bank systemic risk
Building on De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) The time-varying correlation of bank idiosyncratic risk is constructed in three stages.
In the first stage, we construct a standard market model as follows:
From Eq. (1), R i,t is bank i's stock return at week t, while R M,t stands for weekly stock market returns. We calculate bank stock returns and market returns as follows: (2) In Eq. (2), p and m are defined as weekly bank stock prices and market indexes, respectively.
In the second stage, we estimate Eq. (1) using the OLS (ordinary least squares)
regression. In order to obtain the market model that varies from week to week, we estimate Eq.
(1) on the basis of a 52 rolling window from t -51 up to t. In the third stage, we obtain the weekly residuals of Eq. 
In Eq. (3), the number of weeks (k) is set to be equal to 51. According to Engle (2002), Eq. (3) denotes the exponential smoother for the correlation matrix. Engle (2002) further emphasize that RiskMetrics also takes into account declining weights reflected in a parameter λ that affects the exponential smoother. However, given that no specific rule has been applied to determine λ, we follow RiskMetrics as in Engle (2002) to set λ to 0.94. Accordingly,  is the average weekly correlation between the specific risk of bank i with the specific risk of other banks j in the same country.
Since this study analyzes the impact of bank loan growth on systemic risk based on annual balance-sheet and income statement data, we annualize  to obtain the degree of yearly bank systemic risk (SRISK). Higher SRISK reflects higher bank systemic risk.
Moreover, the time-varying correlation of bank stock returns (RCORR) as an alternative proxy of bank systemic risk is also constructed using an exponentially weighted moving average correlation using Eq. (3). In this regard, we use the bank stock return variable instead of the residuals of a single-index market model. Similar to SRISK, higher RCORR is associated with higher bank systemic risk. 
Abnormal loan growth
For simplicity, we denote abnormal loan growth using ADLOAN if LG and AgLG in Eq. (4) are measured by DLOAN as in Eq. (5). On the other hand, ALOANG is used to represent abnormal loan growth if LG and AgLG in Eq. (4) is measured by LOANG.
Credit reporting system
To measure credit information sharing that alleviates information asymmetry on the credit market, we use several proxies of the quality of credit reporting system. These proxies include the depth of credit information coverage (CRINDEX), private credit bureau coverage (PRIVBUR) and public credit registry coverage (PUBREG). CRINDEX ranges from 0 to 6 and measures the degree of credit information available in a country regardless of the ownership types of credit bureaus. In general, higher CRINDEX means higher information sharing activities and hence, more credit information from credit bureaus is available to support bank lending decisions. PRIVBUR and PUBREG represent the proportion of individuals and firms whose credit information are registered in private credit bureaus, and public credit registries, respectively 3 . Higher PRIVBUR and PUBREG are both associated with better credit information sharing.
Control variables
3 See the World Bank's Doing Business Database for the details.
In this study, we incorporate several control variables that may affect the degree of bank systemic risk. We include the ratio of total equity to total assets (EQTA), because it is widely perceived that higher bank capitalization strengthens stability. Hence, higher bank capitalization is expected to overcome bank risk and the buildup of systemic risk (e.g. Arnold et al., 2013; Lee and Hsieh, 2013) . Bank liquidity is also an important dimension of stability.
As such, the ratio of total liquid assets to total deposits and short-term funds (LIQ) is considered as one of the control variables in this study. In addition to that, we incorporate bank credit risk measured by the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets (LLP). As bank credit risk increases, the buildup of systemic risk also tends to increase. Prior literature also highlights the role of "too-big-to-fail" effects in exacerbating bank risk. Therefore, the logarithm of bank total assets (SIZE) is also included to control for the presence of the "toobig-to-fail" issues in banking (Beck and Laeven, 2006) . Finally, the charter value hypothesis and the competition-stability hypothesis highlight that bank systemic risk can also be explained by bank market power (Anginer et al., 2014) . In this regard, we incorporate the
Tobin's Q ratio (TOBIN) to account for bank market power. Following Keeley (1990) and
Haq and Heaney (2012), TOBIN is defined as follows:
MVE denotes the market value of equity, while BVL and TA represent the book value of liabilities and total assets, respectively.
Aside from bank-specific control variables, controlling for country-specific factors is also important to take into account different macroeconomic and institutional characteristics from one country to another. We incorporate two country-specific control variables. These include the degree of institutional development proxied by the degree of economic freedom (ECO), as well as the degree of economic development measured by the logarithm of real GDP per capita (LGDPC).
Methodology
In terms of methodology, we proceed in several stages. In the first stage, we construct two proxies of bank systemic risk (SRISK and RCORR). In the second stage, we examine the link between abnormal loan growth and systemic risk over the 1998-2012 period. For this purpose, we construct the following models as a baseline regression in which i and j represent bank and country indexes, respectively. 
Eq. (7a) Nevertheless, we do not define regression models incorporating these interaction terms at this stage, because such interaction terms depend on the empirical results obtained from Eq. (7a) and Eq. (7b). In other words, it is still unclear at this stage whether credit reporting system variables should be interacted with ALG t-1, ALG t-2, or both.
To estimate Eq. (7a) and Eq. (7b), we use the dynamic panel data methodology developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . Indeed, several studies point out that the current bank performance might be affected by its past values (e.g. Naceur and Kandil, 2009; Naceur and Omran, 2011) . In this sense, current bank systemic risk might also be dependent on its past values. We follow Blundell and Bond (1998) to use the two-step generalized methods of moments (GMM) or the system GMM in estimating our dynamic panel data models. Baltagi (2005) shows that the system GMM produces more efficient output than the one-step GMM.
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As a robustness check, we also examine the impact of abnormal loan growth on systemic risk one year to four years ahead. However, the empirical results are not altered. These results are not presented in this paper, but are available upon request.
In estimating the system GMM, we also take into account a finite sample correction following Windmeijer (2005) to provide robust estimates. We further specify orthogonal deviation transformations of instruments to control for bank-level fixed effects as in Foos et al. (2010) . Time-specific dummy variables are also incorporated in our panel data estimation to control for time-fixed effects associated business cycle fluctuations. Overall, the system GMM estimation is valid, as long as the AR (2) 
Results

Descriptive statistics and correlation structure
In Table 1 , we present the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study.
Moreover, Table 2 shows the correlation structure of all variables. No notable correlation can be detected among bank-specific variables used in this study, although country-specific variables exhibit high correlation. In this regard, we conduct the variance inflation test (VIF) to check whether or not multicollinearity is an issue.. The VIF coefficients of all regressions show that the VIF is less than 5 and hence, multicollinearity issues are less of a concern 5 .
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 ] Table 3 documents the impact of abnormal loan growth on systemic risk in banking.
Empirical results
From the system GMM, it is shown that higher abnormal loan growth based on either ADLOAN or ALOANG is associated with higher systemic risk one year ahead regardless of whether SRISK and RCORR is used as a proxy of bank systemic risk. These results are consistent with previous studies highlighting that higher abnormal loan growth is detrimental to bank stability (e.g. Foos et al., 2010; Festić et al., 2011; Hess et al., 2009 ). However, we find that the impact of bank abnormal loan growth on systemic risk two years ahead is not statistically significant. Overall, the empirical results obtained from the system GMM estimation shown in Table 3 are valid, because AR(2) and Hansen-J tests are not significant, at least at the 5 percent level.
14 [Insert Table 3 here]
In the next turn, we examine whether the impact of abnormal loan growth on systemic risk one year ahead is dependent on the quality of credit information sharing. Here, we only focus on the joint impact of abnormal loan growth (ADLOAN or ALOANG) and credit information sharing (CRINDEX, PRIVBUR or PUBREG) on bank systemic risk one year ahead, given that only the one-period-lagged value of abnormal loan growth is significant. Table 4 presents the empirical results obtained from the system GMM estimation for this purpose, particularly when SRISK is used as a proxy of bank systemic risk. Meanwhile, Table   5 presents the empirical results when RCORR is used as a proxy of bank systemic risk.
[Insert Table 4 and Table 5 ] Table 4 and Table 5 show that higher abnormal loan growth measured by either ADLOAN or ALOANG still exhibits a positive and significant impact on bank systemic risk (SRISK or RCORR) one year ahead. With regards to ALG(-1) x CRINDEX(-1), higher oneperiod-lagged value of CRINDEX is found to have a moderating effect on the impact of abnormal loan growth on systemic risk one year ahead. However, the positive impact of abnormal loan growth on systemic risk one year ahead remains, but with a lower magnitude for countries with higher credit information index. This result holds when ADLOAN is used as a proxy of abnormal loan growth. If ALOANG is used as a proxy of abnormal loan growth, the sign of ALG(-1) x CRINDEX(-1) remains negative, albeit not significant. Both models using ABDLOAN and ABLOANG as the abnormal loan growth measure are also valid, because the AR(2) test and Hansen-J test are not significant, at least at the 5 percent level.
Moreover, in order to examine the type of credit reporting system that matters in affecting the buildup of bank systemic risk due to abnormal loan growth, we consider the role of private credit bureaus (PRIVBUR) and public credit registries (PUBREG). From Table 4 and Table 5 , it is shown that the positive sign on ALG(-1) is outweighed by the negative coefficient of ALG(-1) x PRIVBUR(-1). In other words, the absolute value of the coefficient of ALG(-1) x PRIVBUR(-1) is higher than the absolute value of the coefficient of ALG(-1).
This indicates that higher abnormal loan growth leads to an increase in systemic risk, particularly if the value taken by PRIVBUR is very low, but to a decline in the systemic risk of banks when the quality of private credit bureaus (PRIVBUR) improves. These results are 15 robust regardless of the use of ADLOAN or ALOANG as a proxy of abnormal loan growth.
All dynamic panel data models are also valid, because the AR(2) test and Hansen-J test are not rejected at least at the 5 percent level.
Unlike the influence of private credit bureaus that may reverse the impact of the oneperiod-lagged value of abnormal loan growth on systemic risk, the role of public credit registries in the growth-systemic risk nexus in bank lending remains unclear. Table 4 and Table 5 show that no coefficients related to ALG(-1) x PUBREG(-1) are statistically significant. Finally, the empirical results are also valid because the AR(2) test and Hansen-J test are not significant.
With regards to the influence of bank-specific control variables, only the bank capital ratio (EQTA) has no significant impact on bank systemic risk as shown in Table 4 and Table   5 . Meanwhile, higher bank liquidity (LIQ) is associated with lower bank systemic risk measured by either SRISK or RCORR. Concomitantly, as banks hold more LLP, their systemic risk declines considerably. This is presumably because higher LLP is used by banks to cover the buildup of credit risk which in turn reduces the correlation of bank-specific risk.
Moreover, from Table 3 to 5, it is also shown that the larger the size of banks (SIZE), the higher the degree of bank systemic risk. This result is consistent with the presence of "toobig-to-fail" effects in which larger bank size is associated with greater bank moral hazard (e.g. Galloway et al., 1997; Beck and Laeven, 2006) . Concerning the impact of TOBIN on bank systemic risk, we document robust evidence that higher TOBIN results in lower bank systemic risk. This result follows the "charter value hypothesis" in which bank market power becomes a self-disciplining factor of risk taking (e.g. Keeley, 1990; Ariss, 2010) . In this context, higher bank market power reduces bank incentives to undertake excessive risk taking and hence, bank systemic risk also tends to decline. Finally, the degree of economic freedom and economic development as country-specific control variables have no clear impact on bank systemic risk from Table 3 to Table 5 .
Robustness checks
To this end, although the empirical findings are robust to different proxies of abnormal loan growth and systemic risk, additional robustness checks are also undertaken.
The results of robustness checks are not presented in this paper, but are available upon request.
First, because the impact of country-specific control variables (ECOFREE and
LGDPC) on systemic risk are not consistent as shown from Table 3 to Table 5 , we exclude country-specific variables. This consideration is also made, because all of country-specific variables exhibit strong correlation. However, the impact of abnormal loan growth on systemic risk one year ahead, as well as the role of private credit bureaus in coping with an increase in systemic risk due to higher one-period-lagged value of abnormal loan growth, remains unaltered.
Second, we consider the impact of abnormal loan growth on systemic risk one year to four years ahead following Foos et al. (2010) . The empirical results are not altered, but the number of observations declines considerably.
Finally, in order to eliminate the impact of the 1997/1998 Asian crisis that might affect banking stability in Asia, we reestimate regression models that produce Table 3 to Table 5 , but only for the 2001-2012 period. The number of observations declines, but the impact of abnormal loan growth and credit reporting system on systemic risk one year to two years ahead remains unaltered.
Conclusion
This paper is the first to analyze how abnormal loan growth can affect bank systemic risk in emerging markets. From a sample of publicly traded commercial banks in the AsiaPacific region, the empirical results show that the differences in bank systemic risk can be explained by the one-period-lagged value of abnormal loan growth. Differently phrased, higher abnormal loan growth increases bank systemic risk one year ahead. However, these results are conditional on the quality of credit information sharing at the country level. In countries with a higher credit information index and better private credit bureaus, the positive impact of the one-year-lagged value of abnormal loan growth on systemic risk is reversed.
Hence, the adverse impact of abnormal loan growth on bank systemic stability only occurs in countries with lower quality of credit information sharing, especially if private credit bureaus have lower quality. Overall, these results are robust to different measures of abnormal loan growth and systemic risk.
Eventually, this paper highlights some policy implications at least in the Asian context. While overcoming abnormal loan growth is necessary to deal with the buildup of bank systemic risk, each country has different characteristics in terms of their credit market imperfections. In this regard, bank regulators can consider the role of credit information sharing in mitigating the adverse impact of abnormal loan growth as a complement of macroprudential regulation. As such, strengthening the quality of private credit bureaus is worth considering. Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, while ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
